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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
— vs. — 
BERNICE LEWIS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
W I L L I A M DEAN LAVENDER, 
SHANA L. AMADOR and JOANN 
L. SYLVESTER, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an Interpleader action brought by the 
Travelers Insurance Company to resolve conflicting 
claims to 'the proceeds of an insurance policy upon the 
life of William E. Lavender, who died by aiccidental 
drowning. . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The original plaintiff, The Travelers Insurance 
Company, brought this action pursuant to Rule 22, 
URCP, against Bernice Lewis, who is the second ex-wife 
Case 
No. 13662 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
of William E. Lavender, and against William Dean 
Lavender, Shana L. Amador and Joann L. Sylvester, 
who are the children by his first marriage of William E. 
Lavender. After paying the policy proceeds into Court, 
the insurance company was dismissed as a party (E.67). 
Thereafter, both remaining parties filed motions for 
summary judgment based upon the pleadings, attached 
exhibits and a written stipulation of facts (R.43, Gl, 64). 
After full hearing upon these cross-motions and a con-
sideration of the memoranda of authorities submitted by 
both parties, the Court below denied the motion of 
Bernice Lewis, Appellant herein, and granted the motion 
of Respondents (R.40). Appellant then filed another 
motion entitled "Motion for Re-Hearing on Summary 
Judgment" (R.15), supporting the same with additional 
documents. After another full hearing, Appellant's 
second motion was denied (R.5). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents here seek affirmance of the summary 
judgment entered in their favor below and of the lower 
Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Re-Hearing. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Following are listed in chronological order the facts 
material to the question presented: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
1. On November 11, 1946, The Travelers Insurance 
Company issued to William E. Lavender a policy of life 
insurance, and the latter designated his wife, Helen 
Smith Lavender, as beneficiary (R.43). 
2. On June 7, 1960, Helen Smith Lavender was 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from William E. Lavender 
(R.43). The Decree provided that William E. Lavender 
maintain the policy in question, that his first wife should 
remain as beneficiary, and that the three children, Re-
spondents herein, should be contingent beneficiaries in 
the event of the death or remarriage of the first wife 
(R.38). In its Findings and Conclusions, the Court speci-
fically found that William E. Lavender should be 
permanently restrained from making any beneficiary 
designation contrary to the Decree (R.34). 
3. In December 14, 1962, William E. Lavender 
married Bernice Lewis, Appellant (R . l l ) . 
4. On January 9, 1963, William E. Lavender at-
tempted to change the beneficiary of the policy in 
question to Bernice Lavender, Appellant herein (R.51). 
5. On January 27, 1963, Helen Smith Lavender, the 
first wrife of William E. Lavender, remarried (R.12). 
6. On March 25, 1965, Bernice Lavender, the Appel-
lant herein, was awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
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William E. Lavender; neither this Decree nor its sup-
parting Findings and Conclusions referred to the policy 
in question (R.18). 
7. On June 9, 1973, William E. Lavender died by 
drowning in a boating accident on Utah Lake (R.13). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I : THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 
DIVORCE DECREE ARE ENFORCEABLE BY THE 
CHILDREN AGAINST THE CLAIM OF THE DE-
CEDENT'S SECOND EX-WIFE. 
In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Wilkins, 44 
F.Supp. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), a divorce decree required 
the husband to name his former wife as the beneficiary 
of a life insurance policy. After so doing, the husband 
thereafter executed a change of beneficiary, naming his 
second wife. The Court awarded the proceeds of the 
policy to the first wife, reasoning that to do otherwise 
would be to render the original decree a nullity. This 
case is a leading authority for Respondents' position 
herein, and has been widely followed. See, e.g. Peckham 
v. Metropolitan! Life Insurance Co., 415 F.2d 312 (10th 
Cir. 1969; Candler v. Donaldson, 272 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 
1959); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Enright, 231 
F.Supp. 275 (S.D.Cal. 1964). 
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Other Courts which have considered the question 
presented here have similarly established Bespondents' 
position. For example, in Goodrich v. Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 34 Tenn.App. 516, 240 S.W.2d 263 
(1951), the decedent, in violation of the provisions of a 
divorce decree requiring him to maintain his former 
wife as beneficiary under a life policy, executed a 
change of beneficiary, naming his second wife. In award-
ing the proceeds of the policy to the first wife, the Court 
specifically held that the original divorce decree gave her 
a vested right in the policy, so that the insured's attempt 
to change the beneficiary did not affect her rights to the 
policy proceeds. 
It is clear that the principle applies also to protect 
the children of the insured in cases where a decree of 
divorce had provided that the husband name his children 
as beneficiaries. In Williams v. Williams, 276 Ala, 43,^ 
158 So.2d 901 (1963), a decree of divorce had provided 
that the husband name his children as beneficiaries under 
an existing life policy. The husband, in violation of the 
decree, thereafter named his mother as beneficiary. The 
Court awarded the proceeds to the children, holding 
that the consequence of the divorce decree was to give 
the children a vested equitable interest in the policy, so 
that the attempt to change the beneficiary to the mother 
did not establish superior rights in her, and that equity 
would intervene to declare the children as beneficiaries. 
On the same rationale, the Florida Court has held that 
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the terms of a divorce decree requiring the decedent to 
keep a life policy in force for his children prevented him 
from changing the beneficiary to his brother. Dixon v. 
Dixon, 184 So.2d 488 (1966). The same conclusion was 
reached by the Hawaii Court with respect to conflicting 
claims between the beneficiaries named in a divorce 
decree and the estate of the decedent. Pollick v. Pollick, 
477 P.2d 620 (1970). 
Further, the cases establish that the same result 
will obtain even though, as in the instant case, the bene-
ficiary designation specified in the decree was never 
actually made. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v. Richardson, 
27 F.Supp. 791 (W.D.La. 1939); Binben v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 9 Mich. App. 97, 155 N.W.2d 883 (1967). 
From the above, it is clear that appellants' assertion 
that, as a matter of contract between the insured and the 
insurance company the decedent was free to change the 
beneficiary of the policy because the policy so provided 
is manifestly incorrect; indeed, stated in Peckham, 
supra, 
"The decisive issue presented on appeal is the 
legal effect of the divorce decree vis-arvis critical 
provisions of the group policy . . . . Our own re-
search has disclosed two cases . . . . where the 
court gave effect to a divorce decree vesting one 
spouse with the rights of a beneficiary . . . See 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Wilkins 
(supra) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson (supra) . . . These authorities uni-
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formly demonstrate a manifest respect for the 
divorce decree. And rightly so, since it is deeply 
rooted in the equities of domestic relations." 415 
F.2d at 313. 
POINT I I : THE PRESENT STATUS OF RE-
SPONDENTS AS ADULTS DOES NOT TERMINATE 
THEIR INTEREST BECAUSE THE ATTEMPTED 
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY WAS AN UNLAWFUL 
CONTRACT AT THE TIME IT WAS EXECUTED. 
From the record, it appears that on June 13, 1960, 
the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce between 
the decedent and his first wife, the three Respondents 
herein were ages 17 years (Respondent Amador), 14 
years (Respondent Lavender) and 5 years (Respondent 
Sylvester) (R.47). Further, although Respondent Ama-
dor was married on March 28, 1960 (R.ll), the original 
decree of divorce specifically provided that the dece-
dents support obligation for Respondent Amador was to 
continue despite that she reached her majority (R.46). 
Finally, it appears from the record that decendent's 
first wife had not yet remarried at the time he attempted 
to change the beneficiary of the policy in question (R.12, 
51). It is thus clear that when the decedent aJttempted the 
beneficiary change on January 9, 1963, two of the 
children were still minors, his support obligation to the 
third still existed, and his wife had not remarried. Ac-
cordingly, the attempted change was unlawful because 
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none of the circumstances which might arguably have 
terminated his obligation regarding the policy had yet 
occurred. Appellant claims the proceeds of the policy as 
a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the 
decedent and the insurance company on the apparent 
theory that the beneficiary change, under which she 
claims the proceeds, constituted a part of the original 
insurance contract. But since the change was unlawful, 
the aspect of the contract upon which Appellant relies 
was void at its inception, and Appellant therefore can-
not rely upon the change of beneficiary to claim the 
proceeds. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1960 divorce decree must be given legal effect 
as against Appellant's claim that, because the policy so 
provided, William E. Lavender was free, as a matter of 
contract, to change the beneficiary. To hold otherwise 
would render ineffectual the similar provisions regarding 
insurance commonly incorporated into divorce decrees. 
In addition, to award the proceeds to Appellant would 
condone an unlawful contract made by William E. 
Lavender in direct defiance of the divorce decree, since 
his attempt to change the beneficiary was made when 
his support obligation to Respondents still existed, and 
before the remarriage of his first wife. It is submitted 
that the decree operated to vest in Respondents the right 
to the proceeds of the policy, contingent only upon their 
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mother's remarriage prior to the death of William E. 
Lavender. The contingency having later occurred, Ee-
spondents are now entitled to enforce the decree against 
Appellant's claim; accordingly the decision of the lower 
Court should be affirmed. 
Eespectfully Submitted, 
JAY D. EDMONDS 
Attorney for Respondents 
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